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The court in the instant case determined that the hearing before
the administrative board was not a judicial case, hence the case originated
in the circuit court making it a "trial court."'" It was the court's 15osition
that reason and logic supported this finding since proceedings before boards
and commissions are often conducted without court decorum or regard for
the rules of evidence. In this regard the court said:
Such proceedings before boards and commissions are so often
conducted without regard to proper decorum or observance of the
rules for introduction or consideration of evidence that the work
of the circuit court consists largely in preparing an intelligent
and orderly "case" for review by the appellate court.14
Hence, the court concluded that the case first entered the established
judicial system in the circuit court, and, therefore, the precedent based
on appeals from lower courts to the effect that the circuit court sat as an
appellate court in review of lower court decisions was inapplicable. 15
The legislative purpose in the creation of the district courts of appeal
was to streamline and modernize the appellate system of the state. The
number of administrative agencies is enormous. To restrict review from
such bodies to the district courts to certiorari would thwart the very
purpose of the district courts. Consequently, this determination by the
supreme court that the circuit court sits as a trial court in review of
administrative rulings, by enlarging the scope of the district court's review
as a matter of right, fulfills the purpose for which the district courts were
created. The citizen who seeks review of an administrative order now can
be sure that review will not end with the circuit court nor will it depend
upon certiorari to an overcrowded supreme court.
RAY E. MARCHMAN, JR.
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT - FATHER'S LIABILITY
TO PROVIDE CHILD WITH COLLEGE EDUCATION
A petition was brought by a divorced mother to increase the amount
of child support payable by the divorced father so as to enable the child
in the mother's custody to attend college. The lower court granted the
increase. Held, affirmed: a minor child whose parents are divorced and
13. "... where statutory administrative proceedings are had before administrative
officers, boards, commissions, or other tribunals, with statutory appeals to the circuit
courts, such proceedings do not appear in the judicial department of the state government
as a judicial 'case' until they are brought to the circuit court . State v. Furen,
118 So.2d 6, 8-9 (Fla. 1960).
14. State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1960).
15. Florida Appellate Rule 4.1 which provides that: "All appellate review of the
rulings of any commission or board shall be by certiorari as provided by the Florida
Appellate Rules" was found to be in conflict with the statutory provision of FLA. STAT.
§ 475.35 (1959), and thus without effect.
[VOL. XV
CASES NOTED
who is in the custody of the mother is entitled to receive financial support
from its father for a college education when the father is financially able
and the child is mentally qualified. Pass v. Pass, 118 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1960).
Under the common law and by statute, it is the primary duty of a
father to give care, education and support to his minor children whether
they be in his custody or not.' The extent of "education" under the
common law was only that of a common school education and did not
include college.2 This view was founded on the thought that a common
school education is a necessary, but a college education is not.3 Under
the modern view, when a divorce is involved, the amount of education
which is a necessary has become looked upon as relative to the particular
child, and parent.4 However, it should be noted that a minor child whose
parents are not divorced cannot have a court order his father to provide
him with a college education regardless of the child's mental capacity
or the father's financial position.5
According to the majority of jurisdictions," the child whose parents
are divorced, if properly qualified for college and whose father is financially
1. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Ingalls v. Ingalls, 256 Ala. 321,
54 So.2d 296 (1951); Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934); Bockman v.
Bockman, 202 Ark. 585, 151 S.W.2d 99 (1941); Fagan v. Fagan, 43 Cal. App.2d 189,
110 P.2d 520 (1941); Hobbs v. Lokey, 7 W. W. Harr. 408, 183 Atl. 631 (Del. 1936);
Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Ross v. Richardson, 38 Ga.
App. 175, 143 S.E. 446 (1928); Richardson v. Richardson, 72 Idaho 19, 236 P.2d 718
(1951); Kohler v. Kohler, 326 I11. App. 105, 61 N.E.2d 687 (1945); Harmon v.
Harmon, 116 Ind. App. 140, 62 N.E.2d 880 (1945); Addy v. Addy, 240 Iowa 255,
36 N.W.2d 352 (1949); DeLong v. DeLong, 271 Ky. 815, 113 S.W.2d 455 (1938);
State v. Borum, 118 La. 846, 178 So. 371 (1937); Dronin v. Snodgrass, 138 Me.
145, 23 A.2d 631 (1941); Sause v. Sause, 194 Md. 76, 69 A.2d 811 (1949); Sykes v.
Smith, 333 Mass. 560, 132 N.E.2d 168 (1956); Benjamin v. Bondy, 322 Mich. 35,
33 N.W.2d 651 (1948); Haugen v. Swanson, 222 Minn. 203, 23 N.W.2d 535
(1946); Crum v. Upchurch, 232 Miss. 74, 98 So.2d 117 (1957); Smith v. Smith,
231 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. App. 1950); Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 123 A.2d 3 (1956);
Landes v. Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14, 135 N.E.2d 562 (1956); Lee v.
Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 96 S.E.2d 726 (1957); Schirtzinger v. Schirtzinger, 95 Ohio
App. 31, 117 N.E.2d 42 (1952); Sheppard v. State, 306 P.2d 346 (Okla. Crim. App.
1957); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 175 Ore. 215, 152 P.2d 402 (1944); Commonwealth v.
Bishop, 185 Pa. Super. 362, 137 A.2d 822 (1958); Haakon County v. Staley, 60 S.D. 87,
243 N.W. 671 (1932); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 196 Tenn. 538, 268 S.W.2d 573 (1954);
Hulse v. Hulse, 111 Utah 193, 176 P.2d 875 (1947); White v. White, 181 Va. 162,
24 S.E.2d 448 (1943); Town of Bennington v. Telford, 119 Vt. 397, 127 A.2d 275
(1956); Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 150, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948).
2. Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am. Dec. 537 (1844).
3. Ibid.
4. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926).
5. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15 (1950).
6. Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App.2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1949); Hale v. Hale,
55 Cal. App.2d 879, 132 P.2d 67 (1942); Strom v. Strom, 13 Ill. App. 354, 142
N.E.2d 172 (1957); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d 748 (1948); Refer v.
Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936); Titus v. Titus, 311 Mich. 437, 18 N.W.2d
883 (1945); Payette v. Payette, 85 N.H. 297, 157 Atl. 531 (1931); Cohen v. Cohen,
193 Misc. 106, 82 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Ore. 193,
165 P.2d 272 (1946); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941);
Atchley v. Atchley, 27 Tenn. App. 124, 194 S.W.2d 252 (1945); Feck v. Feck,
187 Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264,
47 A.L.R. 110 (1926). But cf. Deigarrd v. Deigarrd, 114 So.2d 516 (Fla. App. 1959)
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able, is entitled to a court order requiring his divorced father to provide
him with a college education until the child reaches majority. The
Washington court in Esteb v. Esteb7 was the first to embark on this modern
view. There the court took judicial knowledge of the increasing importance
of a college education in today's world and held that the amount of
education which is a necessary is relative to the child.
The courts of Indiana,8 New Jerscy9 and Pennsylvania' have held
steadfastly to the old common law view of education and restrict a divorced
father's liability for his child's education to that of high school. In a recent
Indiana case," the court recognized the existence of a moral obligation
on the part of a divorced father to provide a college education to his
children so that their education may be complete, but refused to order him
to do so.
In the instant case, one of first impression in Mississippi, the court
in construing the Mississippi statutory12 duty of a parent to provide its
minor child with an education, gave great weight to the modern philosophy
of the importance of a college education. Also in support of its decision,
the court was of the opinion that the parent owes a duty to the state, as
well as to the child, to educate thoroughly the minor child. Thus, a college
education is not outside the scope of the parent's duty to educate. No
mention was made by the court as to whether a college education is now
looked upon in Mississippi as a necessary.
From the sociological aspect, the decision of the Mississippi court is
proper. However, from the legal standpoint, does it not create a disparity
between children of divorced parents and those of "happily" married ones
(by ordering the divorced father to provide a trust fund for his minor son's college
education to be applied in the event of the father's death, the court, in effect, sanctioned
the requiring of a father to provide a minor child with a college education beyond
his majority, as the son was 18 years of age at the time of the divorce when the
trust fund was established).
7. 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926).
8. Haag v. Haag, 163 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1959); Hachat v. Hachat, 117 Ind.
App. 294, 71 N.E.2d 927 (1947); Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386
(1931).
9. Jonitz v. Jonitz, 25 N.J. Super. 544, 96 A.2d 782 (1953); Strayer v. Strayer,
26 N.J. Misc. 218, 59 A.2d 39 (1948); Streitwolf v.-Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570,
43 Atl. 904 (1899).
10. Commonwealth v. Wingert, 173 Pa. Super. 613, 98 A.2d 203 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Cooke, 34 Del. Co. 395 (Pa. 1946); Commonwealth ex rel. Binney
v. Binney, 146 Pa. Super. 374, 22 A.2d 598 (1944). See also Commonwealth ex rel.
Stomel v. Stomel, 180 Pa. Super. 573, 119 A.2d 597 (1956) (father, in a divorce
proceeding, voluntarily agreed to provide a college education for one son who was
enrolled in, but not yet attending, college; the court would not require the father
to provide a college education to a second son who was already attending college and
for whom the father had not agreed to provide such education).
11. Haag v. Haag, 163 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1959).
12. "The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor children
and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education, and the care and
management of their estates. ... Miss. CODE ANN. §399 (1942).
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in so far as a college education is concerned? 13 Perhaps through the use
of Pass v. Pass14 and the other cases of the majority view it represents,' 5
the courts will find themselves free to order a financially-able father to
provide a college education to his minor child deserving of such an
education when the parents are "happily" married.
MARVIN H. GILLMAN
REFUSAL TO TESTIFY ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
- DISCHARGE FROM STATE EMPLOYMENT
Petitioner, a temporary county social worker,' refused to testify about
his political beliefs and associations before a sub-committee of the House
Un-American Activities Committee. His refusal to answer was based on
the first and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution. Pursuant
to the provisions of a California statute, 2 which required state employees
to testify before any investigating body when so ordered, and which
made any state employee who refused to do so guilty of insubordination,
petitioner was summarily discharged.3 The California Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal. 4 By certiorari, petitioner challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute, claiming it to be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution; contending his discharge
from state employment for the exercise of a federal right was a denial of
due process of law. Held, affirmed (5-3),5 the statute is a reasonable
exercise of the power of the state to regulate and supervise the conduct
of its employees. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 143 (1960).
Prior to the last decade, the question of the power of the states to
discharge employees who refused to testify before investigating committees
and bodies had not been before the United States Supreme Court,
although numerous state cases had dealt with the problem. The state
courts, with a few notable exceptions,6 have upheld such dismissals. Most
13. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
14. 118 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1960).
15. See note 6 supra.
1. The opinion of the Court deals with petitioner Globe, a temporary county
employee, only. The decision of the state court as to petitioner Nelson, a permanent
employee, was affirmed without opinion by an equally divided court. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren did not participate.
2. Cal. Gov't Code § 1028.1 (1953).
3. Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules § 19.07. (temporary employees are
subject to summary dismissal at any time during their probationary periods.)
4. Globe v. County of Los Angeles, 163 Cal. App.2d 595, 329 P.2d 971 (1958).
5. Mr. Justice Clark wrote for the Court. Mr. Justices Black, Brennan and
Douglas dissented. Mr. Chief Justice Warren did not participate.
6. Board of Educ. v. Mass, 148 Cal. App.2d 392, 304 P.2d 1015 (1956)
(summary dismissal of state employee, who refused to testify reversed); Opinion of the
Justices, 332 Mass. 763, 126 N.E.2d 100 (1958) (advisory opinion holding unconstitu-
tional a proposed statute to discharge employees who refuse to testifv.)
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